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Channel: iran – Tim Marshall – The What and The Why

Israel, Iran and the War for Syria

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For years, Israel and Iran have attacked each other with words and through their proxies. In Iran, calls for Israel’s destruction are routine, and support for militant groups in Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip intentionally challenges Israel’s security. For Israel, meanwhile, “the year is 1938 and Iran is Germany.” Those are the words of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the second-longest serving leader in the country’s history. He has held his position for so long in part because of his ability to convince Israelis that he is best suited to lead Israel in this existential battle with Iran.

It is not surprising, then, that this past weekend’s events seem like a watershed moment. On Feb. 10, an Iranian drone crossed into Israeli territory and was shot down. Israel responded to the Iranian incursion by dispatching fighter jets to attack targets in Syria, including the Tiyas air base, near Palmyra, where the Iranian drone reportedly took off from. Syrian anti-air systems retaliated, striking an Israeli F-16, which crashed after making it back to Israeli territory. This prompted Israel to hit eight Syrian targets and four Iranian positions, according to the Israel Defense Forces. The war of words and proxies seems to be turning into a war between nations.

Lost in this sequence of events is the broader context. Israel is not the only country to have military aircraft shot down by enemy fire in Syria recently. Last week, Russia intensified airstrikes in Idlib province after al-Qaida-linked militants brought down a Russian fighter jet. On the same day the Israeli F-16 went down, Syrian Kurdish fighters reportedly brought down a Turkish military helicopter that was part of Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria. Israel, Russia and Turkey all lost military aircraft during operations in Syria in the past week, and all three are currently working at cross purposes. The Israel-Iran showdown is about far more than just Israel and Iran. It is one aspect of a much larger war for regional power that is being waged more openly with each passing day.

Hazy Alliances

Last week’s crucial developments were not confined to downed military aircraft. On Feb. 6, pro-Assad forces attacked Turkish military forces attempting to set up an outpost close to the city of Aleppo. Some sources reported that an Iranian-backed militia was also involved in the attack. Just two months ago, Turkey and Iran were coordinating a cease-fire in Syria. Now, they are at each other’s throats.

Then on Feb. 7, pro-Assad forces attacked the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in eastern Syria, resulting in U.S. airstrikes. Just two months ago, pro-Assad forces and the SDF were coordinating an offensive against the Islamic State. Now, they too are at each other’s throats. The war in Syria has become more than simply a civil war; it is now a regional war featuring Israel, Iran, Russia, Turkey and the United States.

If this seems confusing, that’s because it is. Allegiances are in a constant state of flux, dependent more on what various sides can do for each other in the short term than on long-standing arrangements or promises of trust. Consider that the U.S.-backed SDF, made up primarily of Syrian Kurdish fighters, is cooperating with the Assad regime so it can send reinforcements into Afrin to combat Turkish troops. In effect, the SDF is cooperating with Assad in one part of Syria and coming under attack from Assad in another part of Syria. Consider too that Turkey, officially part of a tripartite agreement with Russia and Iran to bring an end to the Syrian war, has invaded Syria to protect its interests from Russia and Iran, and yet it is equally hostile to Russia and Iran’s main enemy, the United States, because the U.S. is providing support for Syrian Kurds. The only thing that is certain in this conflict is that no alliance is certain.

Hazy as these strategic arrangements are, they all boil down to one thing: Iran’s attempt to take over Syria. Turkey talked about its invasion of northern Syria for over a year, and its troops entered Afrin with great media fanfare. But while Turkey was talking, Iran was actually doing. Since the Syrian civil war started in 2011, Iran has been dispatching soldiers, militias, money and weapons to support the Assad regime. The result has been the transformation of Syria from an authoritarian military dictatorship friendly to Iran to an Iranian proxy in desperate need of Iranian support just to stay alive. For Iran, that is a massive strategic opportunity: It can make its continued support of Bashar Assad contingent on Assad’s allowing Iran to do whatever it wants in Syria. And what Iran wants in Syria is a forward base into the Levant.

That is what has Israel so nervous. Despite all the rhetoric, Israel and Iran haven’t fought a war against each other because there is no way for Israel and Iran to fight a war. They are too far apart. That would no longer be the case if Iran can make Syria a staging ground for Iranian attacks against Israel. It is one thing for an Iranian proxy like Hezbollah, with its limited number of fighters, to fire rockets at Israel from Lebanon. It is quite another thing for Iran to start building missiles, massing ground forces and stationing aircraft in Syria, just across the Israeli border. To make matters worse for Israel, it has no comparable position on the Iranian border. Even if it did, Israel cannot expend soldiers the way Iran can in a protracted conflict. For Israel, Iran’s nuclear program is concerning, but Syria as a base of Iranian operations is a mortal threat.

Israel’s Advantages

Israel has a few things going for it, though. The Assad regime is not dependent on just Iran but Russia too, and Moscow has no interest in Syria becoming an Iranian protectorate. Russia wants to preserve Syria as an independent actor and a Russian ally, not as a part of Iran’s plan to project power throughout the region. The Tiyas air base, which was the target of the Israeli strike over the weekend, has also been a base for Russian aircraft in Syria. Russia and Israel have close relations – Netanyahu was in Russia just last month to express Israeli concerns to Moscow – and Russia is not looking to pick a fight with Israel. Israel may not be able to fight a conventional war against Iran, but the Israeli air force is without peer in the Middle East – and that includes Russia’s aerial presence. Furthermore, the U.S. has Israel’s back on this one. It doesn’t want Iran in Syria any more than Israel does. The Russian-Iranian marriage of convenience will fracture the more ambitious Iran gets.

Iran’s moves in Syria also directly threaten Turkey, which also has no desire to see Iranian bases on its border. The more Iran engages in Syria, the closer it pushes Israel and Turkey together. Ties between the two have been strained since the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010, but the real reason Israeli-Turkish relations are tense is that Turkey’s position in the Middle East has changed. It went from being a dependable U.S. and NATO ally to a powerful nation-state concerned primarily with securing its own interests, which Israel must view with inherent suspicion. That said, both will see eye to eye on limiting Iran in Syria. If Israel comes to believe Russia is not doing enough to rein Iran in, it will also not hesitate to deepen coordination with Turkey, which would be disastrous from Moscow’s perspective. It would also align with our 2018 forecast.

Last but not least is that the majority of the region’s powers are hostile to Iran. Notably absent from the recent developments in Syria is Iran’s most vociferous enemy, Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who as recently as November were threatening war against Iran, have fallen eerily silent. But make no mistake: Saudi Arabia remains extremely antagonistic to Iran and will support Israeli moves against it (and Saudi Arabia, unlike Israel, is within range of Iran). In addition, Egypt and Jordan remain aligned with Israel. Egypt invited Hamas leaders to Cairo for a meeting this past weekend, perhaps to let them know that their recent willingness to mend relations with Iran is a nonstarter.

Iran is attempting to take control of Syria. Israel does not want that to happen. Israel has been bombing targets in Syria for years to prevent it from happening. It will continue to do so. But Israel’s future depends not on its bombs but on its ability to position itself within a regional coalition that opposes Iran’s ambitions for power. The outline of that coalition is beginning to take shape: The interests of Israel, Turkey and the Arab states are converging. In a sense, Iran is now in the position the Islamic State was mere months ago. The Islamic State’s emergence created strange bedfellows, all of whom cooperated to ensure its demise. Now Iran is seeking to fill the power vacuum left behind by the Islamic State’s defeat. The responses, of which Israel’s attacks over the weekend are just one example, show why in the long term Iran’s gains are likely to be ephemeral. In the short term, however, Iran will press its advantage. The war in Syria has only just begun.

This article originally appeared on Geopoliticalfutures.com and is republished with permission.

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What Now For Kurdistan?

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Often a niche interest in international relations, the Kurds have in recent years see-sawed between being seen as the modern equivalent of a plucky little people to a faraway country of which we know little. The West needed them, praised their bravery, and still does to some extent but how quickly they have faded from the headlines, especially in Iraq. I’d wager that few people know that international flights to the Kurdistan Region, the focus of my article, have been suspended for five months.

The Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by rising Conservative MP Tom Tugendhat, and which probes the policies and performance of the FCO, has just produced a short report on Kurdish aspirations and the interests of the UK. Its overall fear is that “Those who fought against Daesh shared an enemy, but differed in their vision for what should replace it. Now, as Daesh is defeated, past victories risk causing tomorrow’s wars. The UK’s interests are threatened by these conflicts, and examples involving Kurdish groups have already occurred.”

The report examines the Kurdish position in Iraq, Syria and Turkey but omits those in Iran, about whom they received no evidence. It agrees with senior Kurdish witnesses that while the imagination of a ‘Greater Kurdistan’ has been salient, it is not now a practical political objective as “the new generation thinks about their own piece of Kurdistan.”

The report endorses Britain’s One Iraq policy with change only being agreed with Baghdad. It praises the UK’s efforts to persuade the Kurds to defer their referendum last September in return for the great powers backing a structured dialogue between Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, (KRI) and Baghdad on all outstanding issues, with the possibility of a later referendum supported by them.

The Kurds went ahead with the referendum, to which the violent reaction of the Iraqi state included the seizure of Kirkuk and the blockade on flights. Fortunately, the Committee does not leave it there as an undisputed sovereign action. It observes that “Many Kurds feel imprisoned in a country that they see as not implementing its commitments of equality to them. The FCO must therefore (my emphasis) press for these commitments to be fulfilled. The FCO should press the government of Iraq to lift the restrictions placed on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq after the referendum” and “relations between Baghdad and the KRI are now at an historic low, and the risk of fighting was described to us as being high.”

It further observes that “the overwhelming vote in favour of independence was a manifestation of deep frustration and dissatisfaction with the KRI’s place in Iraq,” and that restrictions imposed by Baghdad “will inevitably be seen as punitive, and collectively so.” It says when these restrictions are combined with the role of the Shia militias connected with Iran in confronting the Kurds they “are only likely to encourage the Kurds on the path to departure rather than integration.”

It makes several recommendations that, if implemented by the British government, could boost the UK’s role in defending the Kurds. The FAC accepts the ministerial view that the UK cannot mediate on a sovereign matter but concludes that “The FCO should offer itself alongside international partners in an enhanced role of facilitating dialogue, and should secure the backing and support of the wider international community to play such a role,” given that “different interpretations of the constitution are raising tensions and risking conflict.”

The report caveats this with “if desired” by Baghdad but says it would be “an offer from a sincere and concerned ally that has a long history of close ties and cooperation with both sides and a shared interest in preventing conflict. The FCO should also secure the backing and support of the wider international community to play such a role.”

The report says disputes in the different Kurdistans can only be resolved locally but urges the FCO to “support meaningful political participation and representation for Kurds, as well as cultural recognition, equal rights, and economic opportunities for them, underpinned by national constitutions and achieved through negotiation, as a means of fulfilling Kurdish aspirations. It is not in the UK’s interests for any state to deny Kurdish identity through law or force. It is likewise not in the UK’s interests for Kurdish groups to seek their goals through violence or unilateral moves.”

The MPs also suggest that the UK “should supply and encourage others to provide capacity-building courses and training that equip KRI policy-makers and others with the greater ability to promote political reform and economic reform and diversification.”

It asks the FCO to “not shy away” but set out assessments of the role of Shia militias in retaking disputed territories such as Kirkuk, whether reports of crimes being committed by them are credible, and how much Iran supports, or controls, these militias. Given that the role of the Shia militias and Iran was obscured in and after the attack on Kirkuk, this could usefully redress the balance of blame for the Iraqi reaction to the peaceful referendum.

The report also says “The FCO must be prepared to criticise both Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds when criticism is due,” and urges the FCO to explain its response to what it describes as corruption and the monopolization of power or curtailment of democracy in Kurdistan. Corruption, it adds, is a serious problem in Iraq in general, and could impede reconstruction.

The FAC report is less substantial than the one released by a previous FAC in 2015, but that took a year, involved visits to Iraq and Kurdistan, and focused exclusively on UK-KRG relations, while this involved no visits, and also examined other Kurdistans.

The useful FAC report can only recommend actions to the Government, which will respond within two months. It won’t automatically change British policy or Baghdad’s bullying but at least shows they are both being watched carefully.

* The full report can be read here.

Gary Kent is the Deputy Chair of the European Technology and Training Centre in Erbil and has visited Kurdistan 25 times since 2006 but writes in a personal capacity. @garykent

 

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The What And The Why Of… Yemen.

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The conflict in Yemen is unheard of by many, perhaps due to its complexity.

To summarise;  it could be said that the Yemeni Government forces are pitted against an Islamist tribe known as the Houthis. This is roughly correct but overly simplified.

The Ancient Romans referred to Yemen as ‘Arabia Felix’ – fortunate. Applied today, this is simply inappropriate.

Yemen, as a single country, is a relatively new notion. The North of Yemen gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1918, but the South, under British rule since 1839, didn’t gain independence until 1967. Since then, internal conflicts have been common. North and South did unify in 1990, but unsurprisingly, this new-found unity didn’t last long.

Tensions between the Government and the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia Islamist tribe named after the popular religious leader Hussein al-Houthi from the north, have been bubbling away for years. In mid-2004 the then President Saleh, disliking the popular figure in the north, sent government forces to arrest Hussein. Hussein responded by launching an anti-government insurgency, but he was killed in September 2004. Though a ceasefire agreement was signed in 2010, this was a victory for the Houthis – they now dominated the north of the country, showing their might, and the ineptness of the government.

The uprisings against the Yemeni government escalated in the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011. When uprisings in the likes of Egypt saw relative success, it gave the Houthis an opportunity. The protests grew more aggressive and eventually, a peace deal was brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council although this subsequently collapsed. President Saleh reneged on his agreements and the Houthis felt that the deal put them at a disadvantage. With no deal and violent protests on his hands, Saleh fled the country after handing power to his Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi in 2012.

Installing Hadi as President didn’t help. The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God) continued the uprising. The conflict raged on and, after a remarkable turn of events, the situation turned even worse for the government: Saleh returned and joined forces with the Houthis; perhaps the Houthis realized they didn’t possess the know-how to run a country, or perhaps Saleh simply wanted power again. This development allowed the Houthis to storm Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, in mid-September 2014, and within weeks this relatively small and unorganized rebel group controlled the capital. Hadi fled to Aden in the south, now the de-facto government base. This had become a North-South conflict once more.

On top of this, there’s another faction: Al-Qaeda, in this region now known as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The fact that the Houthis are Shia has given Al-Qaeda all the impetus they need to get involved. Al-Qaeda, a Sunni Islamic extremist group, strictly apply takfiri thought; they see Shia Muslims as apostates and act accordingly, not wanting to see the Shia controlling Yemen.

As is common in the Arabian Peninsula, religious predilections play an important role in foreign affairs; this conflict is no different. We know that Iran has provided the Houthis with arms and funding in an attempt to topple the government and perhaps install a Shia ruler in Yemen. From Iran’s point of view, this could see Saudi Arabia, a majority Sunni state, sandwiched between Iran to the north-east across the Persian Gulf, and a Shia Iran-friendly Yemen to the south. This is a proxy war for influence in the Arabian Peninsula, too.

Saudi Arabia has a history of conflict with the Houthis across their southern border; Salafi thought and Zaidi Shi’a Islam don’t mix. This, coupled with the threat of Iran, has encouraged the Saudi government (in a coalition of other states including the US) to get increasingly militarily involved to try to prevent the Houthis gaining full north-south control. The Houthis slogan of: ‘God is great, death to the US, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam’ sets the backdrop for US involvement.

It’s not only the land border with Saudi Arabia that’s important. More important, globally, is the Bab-el-Mandeb strait – gateway to the Suez Canal, linking the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. This strait, and the access to the Suez Canal, is vital to world trade; in 2006, an estimated 3.3 million barrels of oil passed through per day. Whoever is in control of Southern Yemen, potentially controls the strait. Across the strait is Somalia, another country beleaguered by Islamic militant groups.

Along with the land border to Saudi Arabia and the Beb-el-Mendeb strait, there’s another feature of Yemen’s geography that complicates the conflict: the lack of water. Yemen has no permanent rivers, and poor policy pertaining to water usage has made matters worse. The lack of water, and of arable land makes agricultural enterprises exceptionally difficult. Much of Yemen struggles to feed itself and is on the brink of famine. The absence of clean water also heightens the risk of disease. The cholera epidemic in Yemen is the world’s worst; an estimated 5,000 people are infected per day. Yemen’s lack of water will prove to be a significant factor in how this conflict plays out.

The humanitarian situation is dire. The local Yemenis’ allegiances aren’t necessarily based on moral or even religious motives, but on which faction provides food, water, or healthcare. This makes an intervention from outside powers difficult and lends itself to pockets of disparate factions throughout Yemen. This is fertile ground for extremist groups who seek to recruit the vulnerable, we have seen AQAP take advantage of this, and now ISIS has ramped up their efforts in recent weeks after several years of relative inactivity in the region. With no solution in sight, this desperation only grows and AQAP or ISIS offers a way out. This should concern all of us.

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Trump’s Decision Takes Us Back To The Future

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President Trump’s decision takes us back to the future; back to 2009 before serious negotiation began – a time when Iran’s ambitions threatened a military clash with Israel which risked dragging other Middle East countries, and the USA, into a wider war. That possibility does not look imminent, but the logic of the situation says that is the trajectory for the long term.

The move also risks accelerating the slow decoupling of America from Europe.

Trump means business, or rather he means to halt the business of trading with Iran. Re-imposed U.S. sanctions are designed to force other countries to reduce imports of Iranian oil and curb investments. Failure to so do means that by November they could themselves face sanctions and find it increasingly difficult to do business in the USA. This includes American allies: South Korea and Japan are major importers of Iranian crude, the EU get 5% of its oil from Iran, and large companies such as Peugeot and Renault have made cautious investments in the country since the nuclear agreement in 2015.

In the short term we can expect the EU nations to stand by the agreement in a bid to save it. Brussels could even pass legislation helping companies which fall foul of the U.S. measures. However, as the months pass it is likely many governments will quietly reduce their economic involvement with the Islamic Republic. If so, then the deal is worthless to Tehran which only signed up to it because its economy was hurting so badly from sanctions.  At that point it may declare the agreement null and void and could even re-start its nuclear enrichment programme. In that event the increasingly hawkish Trump administration, which now includes Mike Pompeo at the State Department and John Bolton as National Security Advisor, will revisit Trump’s ‘fire and fury’ routine it trialled in the North Korea stand-off. All this will lay bare the failure of the Europeans to influence President Trump and show how hollow the ‘bromance’ between him and president Macron really is.

This is all less of a problem for the Russians. They are happy to see fissures between the EU and the USA widen, and overjoyed to see the oil price rise as Iranian crude supplies in the world market reduce.

The Americans are not without support. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel were all highly critical of the 2015 agreement and now back Trump’s decision. The Obama administration and the Europeans argued that the deal would result in Iran reining-in its ambitions to become the leading regional power and instead becoming more integrated with its Arab neighbours. Tehran’s involvement in the wars in Syria and Yemen, and its repeated testing of long range ballistic missiles, gave lie to that.

The Israeli government was the one most vehemently against the agreement. They pointed out that although the U.N inspectors reported that Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium had been drastically reduced, the inspectors had not visited all of Iran’s nuclear sites, and that visits could be delayed by 24 days under the terms of the deal. Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly claimed that Tehran had not stopped developing other elements of the weapons programme, especially long-range missiles. However, despite heralding Trump’s decision it is Israel which is the most nervous about it, fearing Iranian retaliation from its forces and proxy army Hezbollah, both of which are now just across the border in Syria.

Wednesday’s exchange of fire across the Golan Heights is a taste of what is to come.  Iran has not based itself in Syria simply to preserve President Assad.

For the rest of the year the American and Iranian governments will watch to see if other countries abide by the U.S. sanctions, and if so, how much this hurts the fragile Iranian economy. If it does, the recent street protests seen in Iran are likely to grow. Either way, the relatively moderate President Hassan Rouhani will see his strength within the Tehran power structure wane, and the hardliners growing in confidence.  Despite this, Iran will use diplomacy to try and save the 2015 agreement and forge an unlikely common front with the Europeans. If and when this fails, and if enrichment recommences, then the 2009 scenario will come into sharper focus again.

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Iranian Ripples

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Donald Trump has dropped a massive boulder in the world’s diplomatic pond. Its ripples will be felt in every corner of the globe and in some cases the ripples could quickly grow to tsunami proportions.

Let’s start with the epicentre– the Middle East. The region is already peppered with smouldering short fuses: The Arab-Israeli conflict; Syrian civil war; Yemeni civil war; Turks v. Kurd; Qataris v Saudis and Emirates; Saudis v. Iran; The Russian presence; threatened American withdrawal; Hezbollah…

The Iran Nuclear Accord (aka Joint Consultative Plan of Action) was one of the region’s few diplomatic success stories—albeit a limited one.

Since President Trump announced American withdrawal from the Accord, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini has announced that his country will resume work on building a nuclear weapon.

In return, Israel has bombed an Iranian base outside Damascus; announced the preparation of bomb shelters; called up reservists for air defence, intelligence, and home front command units and deployed missile defence batteries in Northern Israel.

Iran’s Army Chief of Staff, Major General Mohamed Bagheri, warned: “If the enemy casts a covetous eye on our interests or conducts even a slight act of aggression, the Islamic Republic will give an appropriate response at an appropriate time.”

Back in Washington, they are celebrating. Not the problems in the Middle East, but the release of three American citizens from North Korean prison.  President Trump hailed the release as a diplomatic triumph for his administration and the best of auguries for his forthcoming summit with Pyongyang’s Kim Jong-un.

Others are most skeptical of summit success. They fail to see any advantage for Kim in unilateral de-nuclearisation, and Trump has said he will accept nothing less.  It will take a raft of promises covering trade, aid, and politics to persuade Kim to give up his nuclear toys.  But why should accept such promises? His good friends, the Iranians, will tell him, as Ayatollah Khamenei, said: “You cannot trust the Americans.”

One person who will celebrate American withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear accord is the recently re-inaugurated Vladimir Putin. Just as the Trump Administration appears to be awakening to the military and political threat of Putin’s Russia, it has created an opportunity for the Russian leader to come in from the diplomatic freezer into which  he was cast in the wake of Russian involvement in Ukraine and Syria.

Russia is the only signatory to the Iran Nuclear Accord with good relations with both Iran and Israel. It is in a de facto military alliance with Tehran in Syria and the two countries have been working with Turkey to negotiate a settlement to the civil war which leaves President Assad in power.  Israel and Moscow have historic good relations. In fact, Israeli Premier Binyamin Netanyahu was in Moscow on the day that President Trump announced US withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Accord.

Putin is the logical, albeit unpalatable, choice for honest broker to negotiate a way out of the diplomatic toilet into which Donald Trump has dumped the world. If he succeeds his political capital, and the capital of the authoritarian system of government that he represents, will increase exponentially.

Western Europe, on the other hand, has suffered a major diplomatic failure.  Britain, France, and Germany – key  American allies for 70 years–practically dropped to their knees and pleaded with President Trump to stay in the Agreement. He spurned them. He even publicly mocked Britain and France days before the withdrawal announcement.

This, plus threatened American tariffs have put the heaviest strain on the Transatlantic Alliance in modern history. The Observer newspaper wrote two days before the withdrawal announcement: “If he (Trump) rips up the Iran nuclear deal, American’s relationship with Europe will also be irreparably damaged.”

Relations across the pond will top the agenda when the EU heads of government meet in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia next week. There is a growing feeling in Europe that the United States can no longer be counted on as a reliable ally. Europe, it is argued,  must develop politically and militarily to replace the support it has lost from the other side of the Atlantic.

Tom Arms is Editor of Lookaheadnews.com

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The US-EU Impasse Over Iran Sanctions

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The United States and the European Union have officially reached an impasse on how to deal with Iran. The first batch of U.S. sanctions reimposed after the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal will kick in at 12:01 a.m. on Tuesday. The European Union – united on this rare occasion – has opposed the move from the beginning. When the U.S. sanctions resume, a revised version of an obscure 1996 EU law referred to as a “blocking statute” will come into effect to shield European firms doing business in Iran from the effects of the sanctions. But the EU’s efforts to protect its companies and to prop up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will be ineffective. The divergence in strategic thinking between Brussels and Washington, meanwhile, will only deepen with time.

The U.S. and the EU had their fair share of disagreements long before the current U.S. administration came to power. The blocking statute, after all, was originally passed in response to U.S. sanctions against Cuba in the 1990s as well as much less consequential sanctions against Libya and, coincidentally, Iran. The statute blocks European companies from pulling out of Iran due to pressure from sanctions without the expressed approval of the European Commission. It also enables EU operators to sue for damages against the entity that imposed the sanctions (in this case, the U.S. government) and prevents any foreign court ruling from applying to EU companies.

At first blush, this seems like an impressive show of unity from the EU, led by France, Germany and even the United Kingdom. (The U.K.’s foreign secretary signed a joint statement committing the U.K. to help ensure European companies doing business in Iran will be protected, so at least on this issue, London will be in lockstep with Brussels even after Brexit is official.) But the statute suffers from two fatal flaws. Before it can be applied, it must be proved that a company is withdrawing from Iran specifically because of U.S. sanctions. But Iran is a hard place to do business even without the sanctions in place, and any company, in the interest of avoiding U.S. repercussions, can make a compelling case that it is leaving for reasons unrelated to sanctions.

In addition, and perhaps more paralyzing, the European Commission has no way to enforce the statute, so enforcement falls to individual member states. That means that if, for example, an Italian energy firm or a Danish shipping company withdraws from Iran because of U.S. sanctions, the Italian or Danish government itself must then punish the company. European companies are more concerned with profits than policy, so enforcing the penalties prescribed by the statute would be an unpopular move. For many of the EU companies involved in Iran, facing sanctions from the U.S. and losing access to the U.S. market is a non-starter, even if they can recoup some of the damages later.

The U.S. and EU see this issue so differently mainly because of energy. The EU imported 37 percent of its natural gas and 30 percent of its petroleum oil from Russia last year. A 2014 European Parliament report concluded that Iran is “a credible alternative to Russia” for both natural gas and oil, and the EU has been pursuing that alternative with gusto ever since the JCPOA was signed. Iran has the second-largest natural gas reserves and the fourth-largest oil reserves in the world – and unlike Russia, which frequently uses its energy supplies as leverage, Iran has no objectives or ambitions in Europe except to make money.

The U.S., on the other hand, isn’t dependent on Russia or Iran for its energy supply. It can, therefore, pursue more abstract goals, namely reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East. The U.S. has been mired in wars in the Muslim world for 17 years and counting, and to withdraw completely without seeing another Islamic State emerge, it can’t leave behind a power vacuum or a regional hegemon in the making. The U.S. thinks Iran might be the latter, and the U.S. administration has come down hard on Iran because it doesn’t believe the JCPOA, as currently designed, will deter Iran’s regional aims or its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

This is an interest-based clash between two entities with very different perspectives on the world. It is also a sign of things to come. The U.S. pushed for European unity during the Cold War because a unified Europe, at least west of the Iron Curtain, could block Soviet power. Russia, though still powerful, is not the behemoth its predecessor was, and the U.S. thinks it can hold the line against Russia in Eastern Europe without being on the same page with Brussels on significant issues. It’s betting it can still inflict significant harm on Iran even with a recalcitrant EU. This is true, but having the full weight of EU member states on the United States’ side would certainly accelerate the process. (The U.S. may offer limited exemptions to key companies if it determines these will not hurt the overall goal of the sanctions, which might soften EU member states’ frustration.) There are also limits to how many times the U.S. can “go it alone” in the Middle East and get results – as history has shown.

For now, though, those limits won’t stop the U.S. from putting pressure on Iran by making it more difficult for European companies to do business there, nor will they solve the serious economic issues in Iran – which bring new signs of political instability with each day. In addition, the EU will have to wait to wean itself off Russia’s oil and gas. In effect, the U.S. has, at least for now, prioritized Iran over Russia. The EU disagrees, and although it can’t do much more than make a big show of its disapproval, it hopes that this will be enough to make the U.S. prioritize its needs once the Iran issue is brought to Washington’s desired conclusion, whenever that may be.

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Trump’s Speech and the New World Disorder

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Like it or not, Trump’s speech at the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly will be remembered as epic for some time. Remembered by scholars keen to know the president’s ideology, by detractors hungry for contradictions and nonsense, and by UN sympathizers as the worst attack ever on this institution.

Punctually, Trump denounced globalism from inside the building that, more than any other, has represented the cosmopolitan aspiration for a world parliament in decades
On the one hand, he again manifested a vision imbued with nineteenth-century geopolitical thinking stating- “America is governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism, and we embrace the doctrine of patriotism”. This is the vision of a world order divided into many sovereign territorialities where individual societies are closed like watertight compartments within their national borders. According to this view, nations behave in analogy with the animal and the vegetal world, following a logic of survival in an anarchic space, where nation also means race.

He has form. In the introduction of his very first episode of The Apprentice, the future President described the world of business in Manhattan as “the real jungle. If you’re not careful, it can chew you up and spit you out. But if you work hard, you can really hit it big”.

On the other hand, Trump’s speech lacked the consistency to the extent he incited other countries to adhere to the mantra of “patriotism, prosperity, and pride” but also “peace and freedom”, rather than succumbing to an undefined “domination and defeat”. The embarrassment must have been palpable in New York. One wonders what is left of the United Nations if the commander-in-chief of its main sponsor is rejecting its political culture.

As a consolation to the aficionados of those two olive branches embracing the world, Trump’s anathema partly reflects a transitional historical moment, a world in flux leading towards an unpredictable international atmosphere. He was clear to what he regards as America’s unfriendly peers and called the dragon in the room into question. There are countries, Trump stated, which “violate every single principle” of the World Trade Organization by designing “government-run industrial planning and state-owned enterprises to rig the system in their favour”.

However – the attack on China, ultimately, highlights the limits of the American globalist grand strategy since the post-WWII era. If the fusion of free market and US military dominance helped American competitive businesses to thrive around the world, nowadays Beijing-backed companies pose a challenge to Washington’s economic and political primacy.

Many expected that Trump would crack the whip on China, but his criticism of Germany was as unexpected as it was clear. After congratulating Eastern European countries for pursuing energetic independence with a Baltic pipeline, he then said: “Germany will become totally dependent on Russian energy if it does not immediately change course”.
Although Trump’s origins are part German, the president seems to have little sympathy for a country “bad, very bad” at a summit in 2017. As with China’s economic competition and geopolitical expansionism, the US has two concerns with Germany: The nationalist economic policy agenda of Berlin is a source of competition to American industries and also of instability in the European Union, particularly given the recent winks and nudges between Germany and Russia. This could lead to German-American relations reaching a post-war low.

On North Korea and Iran, his contradictory worldview appeared. On the former he felt that “the spectre of conflict” has been replaced by a “new push for peace”, but on the latter, he said, “Iran’s leaders sow chaos, death, and destruction”. One wonders whether the shifting of attention from North Korea to Iran is a manifestation of military weakness, among other things.

If the bold rejection of that “horrible” nuclear deal and the tension that this is generating with Europe were not enough, Trump lambasted Venezuela and brought his audience back to the Cold War years, arguing that socialism “leads to expansion, incursion, and oppression”.

Regardless of his invective against the global order, his threats, and his eulogy to patriotism, Trump even managed to thank the United Nations for its work “around the world”. But he warned that this can be done only if everyone contributes and pursues “peace without fear, hope without despair, and security without apology”. But – inviting representatives of members states to listen to the “heart of a patriot” inside them is a long way from Winston Churchill’s hope for the UN – that it would be “a true temple of peace… and not merely a cockpit in a Tower of Babel.”

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Saudi Quicksand

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The extremely likely interrogation, torture, and murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul is set to have far-reaching consequences.

The position of Iran, the civil war in Yemen, the Arab-Israeli conflict, reform in Saudi Arabia, the tenure of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the economic development of Saudi Arabia, US foreign policy and the credibility of President Trump will all be affected.

I should add the caveat that as of this writing there is no body and the Saudis continue to deny, deny, deny. But so far they have failed to explain why Mr. Khashoggi went into the consulate to keep a 1.15pm appointment on the second of October and has never been seen since.   Neither have they offered an explanation as to why he was preceded and followed by Saudi agents, some of whom carried what are believed to be bone cutting tools. Finally, the Saudi officials have failed to explain an audio recording which strongly indicates the interrogation and torture of Mr. Khashoggi.

The onus is on the autocratic ruler of Saudi Arabia— Mohammed bin Salman (aka MBS) to either produce a live Jamal Khashoggi or a credible explanation for his disappearance. So far he has only shrugged his shoulders, arched his eyebrows and replied: “I dunno. Nothing to do with me.”

The immediate casualty of the Khashoggi Affair has been MBS’s showcase economic summit the Future Investment Initiative due to start in Riyadh on the 23rd of October.   The meeting was organised to attract foreign investment to kick-start the Crown Prince’s ambitious Vision 2030 economic plan. This is designed to transform Saudi Arabia from an oil-dependent theocratic kingdom into a socially, politically and economically diverse modern state. Dozens of key players are protesting against Mr. Khashoggi’s disappearance by refusing to attend. MBS’super showcase is threatening to turn into a damp squib.

The Saudis need the money, and not just to diversify their economy. They need to pay for the $110 billion US arms deals that Trump announced at the start of his administration.   They need the weapons to continue to fight their controversial war in Yemen and stand as a regional bulwark against an increasingly aggressive Iran.

From the West’s point of view, Saudi oil is less important than ten years ago. American success in tapping new resources with fracking techniques has completely altered the global energy picture.   In June US oil production hit a record high of 2.2 million barrels a day and America has returned to the glory days of being a net energy exporter.   If, as threatened by Saudi officials, the desert kingdom imposes an oil boycott in response to possible Congressional sanctions over the Khashoggi Affair, it can only push up world oil prices and help the US oil industry.

Politics, however, are another matter.   The Trump Administration has put too many eggs in the basket marked “personal relationship with Mohammed bin Salman”.   The President invested substantial political capital in the Crown Prince by making his first foreign trip to Riyadh. His son-in-law Jared Kushner flies in and out of the Saudi capital. MBS is said to be his new best friend and a keystone in Kushner’s yet to be unveiled and much-trailed Arab-Israeli peace plan.   On top of that, MBS is the driving force behind the anti-Iranian US-Saudi alliance.

By developing a foreign policy based almost entirely on personal chemistry with MBS the Trump Administration has backed itself into the Crown Prince’s corner. MBS is being blamed for the disappearance of Khashoggi. He was blamed for the detention of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and hundreds of dissenting members of the Saudi royal family.   The Crown Prince could fall from power over the Khashoggi affair and would most likely be replaced by religious hardliners.   If he does, America’s Middle East strategy and the credibility of Donald Trump will be dealt a severe blow.

Tom Arms is editor of Lookaheadnews.com

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The Week That Was.

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A week in which there were two major stories, which were about a lot more than just the headlines.

The first was the fallout from last weekend’s dramatic events in Saudi Arabia: The Lebanese Prime Minister Rafif Hariri resigned – while in Riyahd. Houthi rebels in Yemen fired a missile at Riyadh International airport. Dozens of high ranking Princes, officials, and businessmen were arrested as part of an anti-corruption drive. Even the head of the National Guard Prince Miteb bin Abdullah was caught up in the sweep. What? asked the world, is going on in the House of Saud?  What links all these events – and more?  Answer – Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The 32-year-old Crown Prince is moving quickly. He is concerned about the growing Iranian influence in the region, he knows he must change Saudi Arabia’s economy away from reliance on oil, and he knows there will be push back inside the Kingdom from more conservative forces.

Hezbollah

So – Mr Hariri who holds Saudi citizenship, resigns from the Lebanese government, whilst in Saudi, and issues a strong condemnation of Iran, and its proxy army in Lebanon – Hezbollah. This weakens the Hezbollah dominated government –  which the Saudis regards as hostile.  Saudi Arabia joined Kuwait and Bahrain in telling its citizens to leave Lebanon immediately. Whilst conflict does not appear imminent, the stage is being set for a diplomatic war of words between Saudi Arabia and Iran which has the possibility to escalate.

As for the missile launch – which the Saudi’s say was supplied by Iran – Riyadh has said this could constitute ‘an act of war’. Thus, they continued to build the case that Iran is a destabilising malevolent presence in the Middle East, a view also held by the Trump Administration. The head of the US Air Forces Central Command in Qatar confirmed the Americans believe it was an Iranian missile. Lt Gen Harrigian said authorities were investigating how the missile was smuggled into Yemen.

This is all headline stuff – but I’d argue that the most significant move was the anti-corruption arrests. This was a ground-breaking power play by the man who will be the next ruler of the Kingdom. The Crown Prince knows there is a growing desire for change – more than 70% of Saudis are under 30. They are social media savvy… they want to be part of a connected world. That requires modernisation in both economic and social terms. So the arrests need to be seen in the light of the Crown Prince’s VISION 2030 plan. Out with the old – in with the new.

Speaking of out – the Syrian government this week said that ISIL had been chased out of its last urban stronghold in the country. The Syrian military says IS retreated from the town of Abu Kamal although some report suggested there was on-going resistance in the town on the Syrian/Iraq border. You might remember last week we said Iraqi forces were coming the other way and squeezing IS in the Euphrates Valley – that is still happening.  It’s ‘Caliphate’ now consists pretty much of sand and the internet – but it is still a force to be reckoned with.

Chinese National Flag

So, the other major event – President Trump’s trip around Asia.  He travelled to several countries, but it was about one thing – the relationship, between the USA and China. Everywhere he went, Japan, South Korea etc, he had to reassure key American allies in the Pacific to stick with the USA, and be confident it will back them against an increasingly powerful China. Related to this was his speech to the South Korean National Assembly which was tricky. He sought to say he would deal with the threat of North Korea partially by leaning on China diplomatically. But he also said ‘all options were on the table’ and that could mean war which South Korea fears would devastate its capital city – Seoul. On to China, where he said nice things about President Xi and hinted there wouldn’t be a trade war. Publicly the Chinese politely applauded, privately they continued to prepare in case there is one.

In the UK Prime Minister Theresa May was again in the thick of it.  Last week her Defence Secretary resigned, this week she lost her International Development minister. It’s starting to look careless. Priti Patel had gone to Israel, met government ministers, including Benyamin Netanyahu, but, said Downing Street, she hadn’t told anyone in the British government about it! Furthermore, she’d visited the Golan Heights which the UK does not recognise as Israeli territory.  She resigned – but no-one has yet managed to to ask her this question ‘Did you know the UK government policy on the Golan?  If not – why not?  If so – why did you go there?’  Talk of the UK government collapsing over this is far-fetched, it retains the ability to win votes in Parliament and will stagger on for the foreseeable future – what most of us can agree on though is that – it’s a mess.

Finally, something lighter, very light in fact – the Louvre Abu Dhabi was was inaugurated. The latticed design of the dome of the building allows natural light to fill the spaces inside, whilst protecting from the sun’s heat. The 23 galleries house numerous European masterpieces on loan from the Paris Louvre, as well as work from the Chinese artist Ai Wei Wei. There’s also priceless artefacts from the Middle East including a 2,600-year-old Sphinx. This was in with the old, but it’s also new.

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Things We Lost In The Mire – 1

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A very happy and peaceful New Year to all our readers and viewers. 

RUSSIA/ELECTION – The Supreme Court upheld a ban on government critic Alexei Navalny from running for president in 2018. Navalny has called for mass demonstrations on Jan. 28 and a boycott of the March vote.

SPAIN/CATALONIA – Prime Minister Rajoy says the new Catalan parliament will hold its first session on Jan. 17. Parliament will then have to appoint a new government, which could take several months.

TURKEY/RUSSIA – The 2 countries have finalized their agreement for Turkey to buy Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Other NATO members are not impressed…

 

COMING UP – All eyes on Iran: Will the demonstrations fizzle out, continue, but be contained to ‘economic’ protests, or explode into nationwide violence?

 

DIARY –

Mon – German city of Stuttgart bans diesel cars from centre.

Mon – Russia’s Gazprom begins pumping gas to China in a 30 year $400 billion deal – one of the biggest energy deals in history.

Harbin Ice Festival

Mon – Estonia grows by 24 centimetres by changing from the Russian measuring system to the European Vertical Reference system.

Mon – Pope Francis oversees New Year’s Day Mass at the Vatican.

Weds – The U.S. ambassador to the UN, Nicki Haley, hosts a ‘Friendship Reception’ for UN member states.  63 countries have been invited.  There are 193 members of the UN.

Fri – Harbin, China, hosts world’s largest ‘Ice Festival’. Exhibits include ice models of the Colosseum and Empire State Building. Geopolitical significance? None – but there’s some great pics!

Sun – Angela Merkel restarts talks with the SDP to try and agree the formation of a coalition government.

 

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